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Since the end of the Cold War debates about Europeanness, of who are and who are not 
members of this privileged category, have been intimately tied to membership of the 
European Union. In the early part of the 1990s idealism about creating a ‘Europe whole 
and free’ was widespread and was closely associated with EU enlargement. As we know, 
turning rhetoric into reality has been a slow process and following the 2004 enlargement 
questions about the EU’s (and hence Europe’s) final borders – which have never been far 
from the surface – have become matters of considerable debate at both political and 
popular levels. This has been particularly evident in the debate over Turkey’s possible 
future membership, which has left people raising questions as to what the characteristics 
of Europeanness are and whether they are culturally, racially, religiously or 
geographically grounded.  
 
Beyond concerns over preserving particular essentialised notions of ‘European’ identity, 
there have also been concerns over the need to preserve the significant gains of the 
European project. Enlargement fatigue has been accompanied by worries that the recent 
expansion to 27 members may turn the EU into a bureaucratic dinosaur and further 
undermine the democratic legitimacy of the Union. In this respect, the desire to draw the 
final borders of (EU) Europe has become a matter of existential importance for many in 
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the Union, the belief being that continued expansion will not only make the Union 
unworkable, but may actually threaten its durability. Thus, whilst people may disagree on 
where the final borders of (EU) Europe should be drawn, the belief that Europe’s finalite 
should soon be decided is widely held. 
 
Questions of the Union’s borders, however, cannot be separated from questions regarding 
the Union’s security. This is particularly so since the EU has explicitly used the promise 
of future membership in order to promote stability along its borders. Drawing ‘final’ 
borders therefore poses the EU with a dilemma of how it will promote stability and 
security in its neighbouring regions if the carrot of enlargement is no longer available. 
The EU’s current answer to these issues, of where to draw the final borders of the Union 
and how to promote security and stability beyond that border, have been presented in its 
developing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The optimism that this policy 
framework can achieve these goals is evident in the policy’s proclaimed ambition that the 
neighbouring countries will constitute a benevolent and stable ‘ring of friends’.1
 
In the academic literature on the ENP such optimism has been contentious. As Scott 
(2005: 430) notes, analyses have been polarised between those that view the ENP as 
driven by neo-liberal/neo-imperialist assertions of economic hegemony, and those that 
champion it as ‘a potentially progressive form of “post-Westphalian” and “postmodern” 
regionalism’. In this respect, the tendency has been to view the ENP as a reflection of a 
                                                 
1 The concept is used among other places in the Commission’s March 2003 communication on the Wider 
Europe: “The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of 
friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations…..” (European 
Commission, 2003: 4). 
 3
rather fixed geopolitical vision of what the EU is about and how it aims to run and 
organise the broader European space. One of the contentions of this article is that 
adopting such fixed frameworks fails to capture some of the key dynamics that are 
emerging as the ENP develops, whilst it also condemns the EU as lacking capacities of 
social learning. 
 
This article therefore aims to retain space for viewing the ENP as a developmental and 
somewhat fluid process by showing where pressures for change and reorientation may 
lie, thereby avoiding the temptations of a deterministic condemnation or celebration of 
the policy. Theoretically this is achieved in two parts. In the next section the article 
discusses three geopolitical models that are frequently invoked when trying to 
conceptualise the evolving nature of the EU. These models are those of a Westphalian, 
Imperial and Neomedieval Europe. However, whilst there is a temptation to reify the 
differences between these models, and not least also the trajectory of the EU’s 
geopolitical development, in the following section, we utilise a framework recently 
employed by William Walters (2004) to conceptualise a series of different geopolitical 
strategies (geostrategies) employed by the EU in regard to its borders and near abroad. 
Geostrategies can be seen as sets of competing and overlapping discourses concerned 
with how to organise territory and space at the border, and how to relate to the otherness 
beyond. Our argument is that whilst particular geopolitical models/visions may lend 
themselves to particular geostragies (and vice versa), there is also considerable fluidity 
present, with the EU at times emphasising one geostrategy over others, or emphasising 
different ones in different geographical contexts. 
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 This enables us to tell a more dynamic story regarding the developing nature of the ENP, 
of some of the criticisms it has faced, and not least regarding what the ENP experience 
may say about the EU’s evolving nature. In short form, the following analysis illustrates 
how and why the ENP emerged as a somewhat reactive and defensive policy driven by a 
desire for homogenisation and standardisation of EU policy towards its new 
neighbourhood. In turn this has become a standard point of critique of the ENP, the view 
being that the generalisation of the ENP from its original focus on the eastern border, to 
the EU’s borders as a whole, has created a one-size-fits-all policy inappropriate to dealing 
with the specificities of the EU’s various borders. In turn this has prompted criticisms 
that, despite its stated aims, the ENP will not solve the EU’s security concerns regarding 
its external borders because it will fail to extricate the EU from a logic that links external 
security with the need for further integration of outsiders.  
 
Whilst we agree that an overarching imperial geopolitical vision has been present in 
Commission documents on the ENP we argue this has been complicated by the fact that 
this imperial geopolitical model has been coupled with different geostrategies in different 
regional contexts. Ultimately the existence of these different geostrategies of the march, 
limes, colonial frontier and networked (non)border complicate what is actually meant 
when analysts label the EU as having a tendency towards ‘imperial-type’ policies. In part, 
what this complex intermingling of geopolitical models and geostrategies indicates is the 
extent to which the ENP is being shaped by discourses and practices coming from both 
the EU centre as well as from the regions. Having laid out the conceptual frame the final 
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part of the paper demonstrates how differentiation has begun to make its way onto the 
ENP agenda by pointing to the fluidity with which the EU employs geostrategies along 
its external border. The result, we argue, is that the geopolitical visions and geostrategies 
adopted at different points along the border ultimately means that the ‘geopolitical 
nature’ of the EU looks different depending on whether one is looking from a southern, 
eastern or northern perspective. Conceptualising the ENP in such discursive terms leaves 
space for seeing the dynamism present within the ENP, as well as for highlighting the 
critical role that outsiders and those on the margins can play in not only shaping EU 
border policies, but also geopolitical visions of Europe more broadly. 
 
 
Models of European Geopolitics 
  
As noted, since its inception debates have raged both about the ultimate character of the 
European Union (EU) and its final borders. It has become common to posit ideal models 
to try and capture the EU’s evolution, the three most common being those of a 
Westphalian, Imperial and Neomedieval Europe (see figure 1) (Browning, 2005).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The Westphalian model depicts the EU steadily coalescing and assuming all the 
characteristics of modern statehood as sovereignty is steadily moved away from the states 
to the Commission in Brussels. Power, in this model (and as indicated by the arrows in 
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the figure), is seen as held at the centre but as applied consistently over the territory up 
until the border, where one sovereign territoriality meets another.2 Evidence for such a 
modernist model is often drawn from the oft-stated desire that the EU should develop into 
a unitary actor, that it should have its own currency and border regime (Schengen), and 
not least its own foreign and security policy including a foreign service and a ‘European 
army’. Most recently the allure of statist terminologies within the European project has 
been evident in the desire to provide it with a constitutional treaty, though as Christiansen 
(2005: 73) notes, despite the ensuing brouhaha over its ratification, in legal terms it was 
always a constitutional treaty rather than a European constitution. As such, although its 
detractors find the Westphalian metaphor attractive to mobilise popular opinion, the 
intergovernmental nature of the Union undermines the utility of this model.  
 
Unlike the Westphalian metaphor that depicts the EU as having clearly defined statist 
borders across which governance is relatively uniform, the Imperial model depicts EU 
governance in terms of a series of concentric circles. Power, here, is understood as 
located at the centre in Brussels and dispersed outwards in varying, multilayered and 
declining degrees (Wæver, 1997; Zielonka, 2001: 509). A geopolitical drive premised on 
an imperial logic has been evident in the EU in at least two respects. First, notions of the 
EU as possessing a ‘peace mission’ to bring stability throughout Europe have provided 
the EU with both moral and identity prerogatives to try and organise the space beyond its 
borders and to spread ‘European values’ to those on the outside. Slogans of building a 
‘Europe whole and free’ and a ‘Europe without dividing lines’ reflect such an endeavour.  
 
                                                 
2 On modernist/Westphalian approaches to territoriality see Ruggie (1993). 
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Second, this desire to foster stability and security through the spread of ‘European values’ 
and practices is also enhanced by ‘security discourses’. As Tassinari (2005: 1) notes, the 
EU has traditionally been stuck in a dilemma between balancing desires for further 
integration with those of ensuring the Union’s security (also see Smith, 2005). The point 
is that the EU has tended to see its outside as a source of instability and insecurity. This 
has resulted in two policy responses. First, there has been a desire to preserve the security 
of the inside by asserting the need for the Union to develop rather impermeable borders 
to keep the danger excluded at the gates of a fortress Europe, as evident, for example, in 
Westphalian readings of the Schengen visa regime (Grabbe, 2000). Second, however, to 
overcome the external threat and to live up to EU ideals of an open peace project, policies 
have also been developed to extend EU systems of governance to those beyond its 
borders in order to bring stability and security. This has been achieved through a variety 
of measures from the Association Agreements to the Balkans Stability Pact, to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, to the NDI. Central to the effectiveness of most of these 
policies has been the conditionality mechanism by which states that comply with EU 
reform goals are rewarded with a closer relationship with the EU. The ultimate carrot has 
been EU membership, at which point, however, the integration-security nexus begins all 
over again in relation to the EU’s new neighbours. 
 
However, whereas previously the EU has deferred the question of its final borders by 
pushing forward with another round of enlargement, it appears this is no longer possible. 
The constitutional crisis and the widespread scepticism regarding future enlargement to 
countries like Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, let alone states in North Africa, seems 
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to have taken enlargement off the agenda for the time being and has meant the EU needs 
a new policy both to cope with and hopefully overcome this ‘integration-security 
dilemma’ – that is, how to promote stability and security without having to rely on the 
carrot of future enlargement. The ENP is designed to fill this gap. 
 
The third geopolitical model is that of a neomedieval Europe. The neomedieval metaphor 
depicts power in Europe as dispersed in a more radical fashion to that of the Imperial or 
Westphalian models, with power no longer fixed on a single centre in Brussels, but as 
being far more regionalised and corresponding to logics of transnationalism and network 
governance, depending on the particular issues at play. In this respect, Scott (2005: 444) 
speaks of a geopolitics of ‘dimensionality’ ‘where geopolitical thought is informed by 
many “centres” rather than by one dominant “core”’. This model also resonates with the 
multilevel governance literature (e.g., Filtenborg et al., 2002; Ruggie, 1993) where 
European governance is seen as focused more around issue networks than territorial 
spaces. Conceptualised slightly differently it has also been visualised in terms of a 
‘Europe of Olympic Rings’ in which regionality becomes the core constitutive organising 
principle of European political space and where governance, authority and decision-
making is dispersed and brought closer to the people (Joenniemi, 2000: 129-31; 
Medvedev, 2000: 100). 
 
It is in northern Europe where ideas of a regionalised and neomedieval Europe have been 
most clearly embraced. This has been particularly notable in Finland’s promotion from 
1997 (Lipponen, 1997) of the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) as a part of the 
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external policies of the EU and which has been seen to challenge centralist 
understandings by locating subjectivity and power in the margins and regions. One 
interesting aspect of the NDI, for example, is its use of the term ‘North’, rather than 
‘Nordic’. This was a deliberate attempt to leave the borders of the North (and therefore 
also the EU) open and inclusive. Notably, commentators have pointed out that the benefit 
of the North lies precisely in its symbolic value as a largely blank space where new 
stories of togetherness might be written and new relationships forged in the process of 
overcoming entrenched stereotypes embedded in the concepts of East and West 
(Medvedev, 2001). The North transcends East-West divides and entails thinking about 
borders in rather open terms.  
 
Importantly, the NDI has promoted a rather neomedieval geopolitical vision of European 
political space, especially to the extent that it has entailed an emphasis on developing a 
regional space that transcends the EU’s borders and where regional partners and EU 
outsiders (especially Russia) have been understood as equal partners in the formulation 
and implementation of projects. The NDI’s vision, therefore, has been of contributing to a 
rather decentralised Europe, where regions might become constitutive entities in their 
own right and where space has been provided for outsiders to have a genuine voice in 
European border policies (Christiansen, 1999: 194). In practice, of course, the NDI has 
not always operated in accordance with the rhetoric. At times neomedieval 
decentralisation and openness has been replaced by an emphasis on asserting the 
hegemony of the centre in a more imperial fashion. Partly this has been because the EU 
sometimes finds it difficult to step outside hierarchical depictions of itself in relation to 
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its outside. Rhetorically this has been evident in how Russians have often remained 
objects of EU discourse ‘to be saved’, with Russia seen as having little to offer its 
Western neighbours (aside from natural resources) (Browning, 2003).3 However, to pay 
too much attention to the limitations of the NDI is to miss the point that the very exercise 
has been highly innovative, putting onto the EU agenda an alternative model of European 
geopolitics and governance. 
 
 
Conceptualising EU Border Geostrategies 
 
Highlighting these different geopolitical models (widely employed by others) is the first 
part of our conceptual framework to try and capture the developing nature of the EU and 
European space and governance. Arguably, however, this framework lacks sufficient 
explanatory power on its own because it is overly parsimonious and lacks dynamism. The 
problem is that discussion of geopolitical models easily results in their reification and a 
simplification of the nature of the policies under analysis, not least because one can be 
westphalian, imperial or neomedieval in different ways, whilst one may be more than one 
of these at the same time in different locations. We therefore propose supplementing the 
framework of geopolitical models with a scheme developed by William Walters for 
thinking about the various geostrategies the EU employs along its borders. 
                                                 
3 This has also been evident in visual representations of the NDI as presented in a video posted on the 
website of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999, A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the 
European Union virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/northdim2.html. At the same time, the decentralised 
neomedieval visions of the NDI have also been undermined by Russia, which at times has viewed its 
emphasis on the exploitation of the resources of north-west Russia as thinly veiled neo-imperialism. 
Similarly, Moscow has also worried that the decentralising and regionalising aspects of the initiative would 
grant Russia’s north-west regions too much freedom and encourage the final break up of Russia (Haukkala, 
2001; Joenniemi and Sergounin, 2003. 
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 For Walters the term geostrategies refers to particular border discourses as opposed to 
broader geopolitical visions. 
 
[A] geostrategy corresponds with a particular way of organising the space of the border. It 
presupposes many things, including particular definitions of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of 
the polity, the types of threat or problem which the border is to address, and specific 
accounts of the time and the space of the border. Geostrategies entail certain 
territorialisations. Each implies a particular form of controlling space and population. But 
they also presuppose particular definitions as to the identity and political rationality of 
Europe (Walters, 2004: 675). 
 
Different geostrategies, therefore, entail particular mental geographies and perceptions of 
particular landscapes and territories. They entail particular ways of approaching and 
dealing with the land, of how to move within it and how to change and order it. Thus, 
they are not simply descriptions of what is, but are also prescriptive of how one relates to 
the land and tries to shape it.4 Walters contends that multiple geostrategies are evident in 
EU border policies. Furthermore, these can coexist in the discourses surrounding 
individual policies, with particular geostrategies being more important in some contexts 
and times than at others. As such, Walters asserts that geostrategies should not be seen as 
totalising descriptions of reality, but as frames built on particular logics. 
 
                                                 
4 There is an interesting similarity here with the concept of ‘mindscape’ developed in Liulevicius (2000: 
151). 
 12
Geostrategy is to be understood at the level of political aspirations, objectives and 
ambitions. To identify particular geostrategies is not to assume that these aspirations are 
necessarily accomplished or fully realised. Hence, to speak of … [a particular 
geostrategy]… is not to imply that the EU’s frontiers fully conform to these images, only 
that this is one possible play of forces or line of development. The geostrategy is more a 
case of a certain will to shape reality according to a particular image than an actual state of 
affairs. This theoretical position means that we can acknowledge the possibility of multiple 
geostrategies converging on, and investing a particular, borderspace (Walters, 2004: 679). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
More particularly, Walters identities four EU geostrategies (see figure 2). The first is the 
networked (non)border. This geostrategy resonates with ideas of deterritorialisation and a 
borderless world that are clearly evident in postmodernist debates about Europe, as well 
as in globalisation studies. This geostrategy, he notes, is underlain by neoliberal concerns 
to remove obstacles to the free movement of people, goods and services and of 
overcoming the barriers which divide Europe – all goals clearly stated in the core EU 
treaties (Walters, 2004: 679). Also central to this geostrategy is the view that spatial 
borders – lines on the ground – are becoming less relevant. For example, policing and 
systems of control that used to take place at clearly defined border lines is increasingly 
being dispersed throughout the territory, as well as taking place in close (networked) 
cooperation with outsiders. In this respect, the whole national/European territory has 
become conceptualised as a borderspace, whilst ‘effective frontier control is to be sought 
through cooperation between state agencies on both sides of the frontier’ (Walters, 2004: 
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680, 682). Instead of us-them divides, this geostrategy envisages sharing responsibility 
with outsiders and emphasising strategies that transcend traditional views of borders. 
 
The second geostrategy is that of the march. Marchs can be understood as indistinct 
zones separating different entities; a kind of running out and intermingling of space 
between groups. Walters refers to the Anglo-Welsh marchs of earlier times when English 
and Welsh settlements along the frontier were often interspersed and the border between 
inside and outside fluid. In other ways the march might be perceived as a border area, ‘an 
interzone between powers’, or even as a buffer zone (Walters, 2004: 683-84). The 
German concept of Zwischeneuropa (Europe Between) to describe the border zone of 
East European states separating Russia (the East) from Western Europe is another 
manifestation of this idea (Saarikoski, 1997). Understood as a buffer zone, however, the 
implication is that the march is a geostrategy that perceives a particular space as a 
security zone separating the cosmos from the chaos outside, it is a protective belt keeping 
the disorder (beyond Eastern Europe) at a distance. However, Walters indicates that the 
march might be a dynamic phenomenon in itself. Thus, if prior to 2004 the EU perceived 
central and eastern Europe as a buffer zone of security, with enlargement they are now on 
the inside and a new buffer zone further to the East is being envisaged. 
 
The third geostrategy is that of the colonial frontier. This geostrategy conceives of the 
frontier as ‘a dynamic space, a meeting point between a power, a culture and its outside. 
It is a space of interaction, assimilation, violence but also pacification’ (Walters, 2004: 
687). Importantly the colonial frontier is mobile and conceived as something to be 
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expanded and projected outwards. More particularly, the notion of the colonial frontier is 
also infused with a power asymmetry in which ‘the expanding power assumes a right to 
define what is appropriate and just. It is an organisation of political space in which the 
centre is the acknowledged repository and arbitrator of what is proper’ (Walters, 2004: 
688). Central to this geostrategy, therefore, is the notion of the transformation of the 
outside in line with the preferences of the inside and the outside’s gradual incorporation 
within the inside. 
 
The fourth geostrategy is that of the limes. As Walters (2004: 690) puts it: ‘If the space of 
the march is an area between powers, an interzone, and that of the modern frontier a finite 
line demarcating and separating territories, then the limes is more like an edge, fringe or 
limit’. In some respects the limes is similar to the spatial imagination of the colonial 
frontier, with one significant difference. Whilst the geostrategy of the colonial frontier 
perceives the frontier as open to expansion, a geostrategy of the limes perceives the 
frontier as more permanent, even if somewhat hazy. Like the colonial frontier the limes 
draws a hierarchy between the inside and outside and institutionalises asymmetric 
relations between unequal powers; however, whereas the colonial frontier aims to 
incorporate the outside into the inside, the limes is more about drawing a limit of 
expansion and consolidating and preserving what the empire has achieved and 
incorporated (Walters, 2004: 691).  
 
Having laid out Walters’ four geostrategies it is tempting to associate them directly with 
the particular geopolitical models (Westphalian, Imperial, Neomedieval) noted above. 
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For example, the geostrategy of the colonial frontier clearly resonates with the model of 
Imperial Europe, and might be seen as manifested in the idea of the Union as having a 
Europeanising vocation and civilising mission to project itself beyond its borders. 
Similarly, the geostrategies of the march and of the networked (non)border might 
respectively be tied to the Westphalian and Neomedieval models, with the march 
emphasising the externalisation of threats and a defensive strategy of exclusion, whilst 
the networked (non)border rather emphasises policies of decentralisation, networking and 
treating the outside as equal partners.  
 
It is, however, important to remain open about this. As noted an imperial model might 
also be tied to a geostrategy of the limes, whilst linking the models and geostrategies too 
closely arguably precludes two things. First, it makes it harder to conceptualise the fact 
that the different models and geostrategies will be present in different strengths at the 
same time and in different locations. Second, it also makes it harder to see that the 
geostrategies and models might actually meld into each other over time. For example, a 
geostrategy of the limes (which entails a somewhat defensive reading of security and of 
the possibilities of transforming the outside), might over time meld into a colonial 
frontier geostrategy (which aims to transform the threatening outside into oneself and as 
such entails a positive attitude as to the possibilities of achieving this) (Walters, 2004: 
692). The point, therefore, is that it depends on whether the empire is in an expansionist 
or consolidative mode at that particular border. 
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Having laid out this combined framework, in the following we show how different 
geostrategies and geopolitical visions have been prominent at different points in time and 
in regard to different parts of the EU’s new neighbourhood in respect of the EU’s new 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Thus, whilst it makes sense to speak of certain 
geopolitical visions and geostrategies dominating or transforming into others in some 
contexts, others will be most relevant at other locations along the border. 
 
 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
As indicated above, with the last round of enlargement the EU has been compelled to 
coin an increasingly explicit geopolitical doctrine to deal with the challenges posed by its 
new neighbours. This is because the previous stance of promised future membership in 
return for reforms is now off the agenda for the foreseeable future. Despite possible 
exceptions (e.g. Turkey, Western Balkans) increasingly it is being argued the EU has 
reached its territorial limits. In this section, therefore, we further highlight some of the 
initial rationale behind the ENP and point to how it has been interpreted in the ensuing 
academic debate around the policy. Focusing primarily on EU (rather than regional) level 
discourses we demonstrate how it has become easy to label the ENP as an exercise 
founded on an imperialist geopolitical model of the EU vis-à-vis its neighbourhood. 
However, what we also demonstrate is that the nature of this ‘imperialist’ model has not 
been straightforward, but has been complicated by the existence of different 
geostrategies. In the article’s final section we then complicate the picture even further by 
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focusing on how the ENP has been mediated through more regional specific discourses, 
with these having important constitutive effects on what the ENP and ‘EUrope’ may look 
like in different regional contexts. 
 
In their simplest form the challenges understood as posed for the EU by the 2004 
enlargement in respect of the new neighbours were threefold. First, how to avoid the 
alienation of its new neighbours? Second, how to promote reform when the EU’s primary 
carrot of future membership is no longer available? Third, how to avoid the EU external 
border becoming a line of exclusion and negative othering? 
 
In the academic literature it is commonly argued that the ENP, in its current framing, is 
unlikely to provide the answer to any of these challenges. This is because ultimately, and 
despite aspirations otherwise, the ENP fails to transcend the ‘integration-security 
dilemma’ that has driven its approach to its border states in the past. This has led 
commentators to argue that the ENP has so far remained premised on an imperial 
geopolitical vision, conceiving of its outside in terms of what Emerson (2002) calls a 
hierarchical ‘friendly Monroe doctrine’. However, if the geopolitical vision/model behind 
the ENP has been an imperial one, this imperialism, we argue, has actually been imbued 
with different geostrategies to different degrees. Indeed, geostrategies of the limes, march 
and colonial frontier have all been apparent, which complicate what it means to talk of 
the ENP as promoting an imperial vision of the EU in Europe. Thus, whilst the policy’s 
initial over-riding logic and rationale has arguably been one of a limes geostrategy (of 
consolidating the empire and drawing final borders in view of the recent enlargement), 
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geostrategies of the colonial frontier and the march have also played important roles in 
the discourse. 
 
Evidence to suggest that the ENP has so far been unable to transcend the integration-
security dilemma, and as such reproduces an imperial logic for the EU, is often seen in 
that the new neighbourhood created by the 2004 enlargement has primarily been viewed 
as a source of threats to the EU (Jeandesboz, 2005). The documents that initiated the 
process of formulating a more explicit policy stressed needs such as avoiding ‘the risk of 
negative spillover’ – with such ‘threats’ usually conceived in terms of illegal 
immigration, terrorism, organised crime, communicable diseases, and social problems 
associated with poverty, etc.5 However, the threat is also conceived in terms of 
enlargement itself, where the ENP has been presented precisely as a policy to stave off 
future enlargements that would undermine the EU’s overall coherence, legitimacy and 
viability. Either way, the outside has been conceived as something to be kept outside and 
guarded against.6  
 
Notably, however, instead of simply drawing a line of ultimate exclusion, as would be 
dictated by a modernist Westphalian view of the EU, external threats are to be countered 
by EU attempts to order the space beyond its borders through the export of EU norms and 
                                                 
5 The UK letter that sparked off the process in 2002 underlined that ‘Within three years, Ukraine and 
Belarus will border the EU – with all the attendant problems of cross-border crime, trafficking and illegal 
immigration. Moldova will not be an EU neighbour until later [….] but it already faces grinding poverty, 
huge social problems and mass emigration’. Letter from Jack Straw to Josep Piqué (Foreign Minister of 
Spain), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London 28 January 2002.  Whereas the UK letter was mainly 
premised on perceptions of threat, the letter sent somewhat later by the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Rengeringskansliet, Stockholm, 8 March 2002) emphasized the duty of the EU to formulate policies in 
view of the ‘Big Bang’. For an analysis, see Jeandesboz (2005). 
6 As Pardo (2004: 735) puts it, the aim has become one of keeping the chaos on the outside, whilst at the 
same time trying to enhance security by keeping the outside friendly. 
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practices. Thus, in the view of Del Sarto and Schumacher, the driving motivation for the 
establishment of the ‘ring of friends’ has been the security concern to create a buffer zone 
between the EU’s inside and outside. Ironically, this is to be achieved by to some extent 
blurring the external border with its immediate neighbours in some areas, in order to 
make those neighbours responsible for effective control of their borders with neighbours 
even further to the East and South – thereby pushing the threat of the outside away from 
the EU’s own borders (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 19, 25-6). Blurring is thus 
understood as a way to push threats further away and is illustrative of a more general 
imperial framework in how the EU looks at its outside. More specifically, however, the 
emphasis on creating a security buffer zone resonates with geostrategies of the limes (of 
consolidating the empire) and march (of pushing the threat beyond). To reaffirm, 
therefore, this ‘buffering logic’ does not result in a modernist, Westphalian approach to 
the EU’s borders (of drawing a strict line separating inside and outside), but rather sees 
the EU’s governance as ‘fading out’ into the space beyond in a more concentric, imperial 
pattern. In this respect, the concept of the ‘ring or friends’ promotes a hierarchy of 
otherness in that the drawing together of a group of ‘friends’ is also a way by which those 
‘friends’ are also designated as ‘foreign’ (at least more foreign than ‘candidate’ 
countries), whilst those outside the ‘ring of friends’ are condemned to another implicit 
category of ‘non-friends’ or ‘geographical others’. 
 
However, despite the emphasis on the dangerous and threatening others to be kept outside 
geostrategies of the colonial frontier are also evident in EU discourse surrounding the 
ENP, where a more positive view of the possibilities of transforming the outside (and 
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potentially even incorporating it) remain evident. This is evident, for example, in that 
despite the stress on discourses of ‘threat’, at times emphasis has also been placed on the 
Union’s self-conceptualisation as a peace project with a mission to spread its values to 
the rest of the world, which is seen to provide the EU with a duty to face up to the 
challenges posed by the nearby areas in more constructive ways beyond adopting solely 
exclusionary or security driven policies (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). Thus, the European 
Commission (2004: 3) has declared that the aim of the ENP is also to ‘share the benefits 
of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, 
security and well-being’. Likewise, at times commonalities of interests between the EU 
and its new neighbours have been stressed and seen as an opportunity for the Union 
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). These discourses of duty and opportunity arguably resonate 
more with a colonial frontier geostrategy since they have entailed a more explicit belief in 
the possibilities of transforming the outside in line with EU preferences and are indicative 
of an EU that retains expansionist ambitions in this regard.  
 
Even more notable, however, is that a colonial frontier geostrategy appears embedded in 
the very traditional mechanism of conditionality the EU is using to implement the ENP – 
and which it might be argued provides a further reason why the ENP is unlikely to 
transcend the integration-security dilemma. Conditionality is evident in that the ENP rests 
on promises to upgrade political and economic relations with the partner countries (to the 
extent that the EU’s Four Freedoms might be extended to them in their entirety7) in 
                                                 
7 The Four Freedoms relates to the freedom of movement of goods, capital, people and services. This goal 
reflects Romano Prodi’s oft stated comment that what is on offer in the ENP is ‘everything but institutions’. 
As one of the Commission documents puts it, ‘all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect 
 21
return for tangible progress in implementing internal reforms. The previous logic behind 
enlargement therefore remains intact, except now it is emphasised that everything is 
possible bar institutions (i.e. membership).8 As noted by Berg and Ehin (2006: 60), 
‘Central to the neighbourhood paradigm is the notion of conditionality – a system of 
sticks and carrots in which soft and open borders constitute a reward for progress in 
meeting European standards’. The alternative, though, is also possible with the EU 
emphasising it may also punish countries through a partial or total suspension of 
assistance if neighbours’ commitments are not met (European Commission, 2004: 3). In 
other words, the EU is setting conditions that have to be met in order to qualify for 
inclusion in the category ‘friends’. 
 
Importantly, however, the reliance on the conditionality mechanism has enabled the 
Commission to stress the ENP as being open to ‘differentiation’, as being founded in 
ideas of ‘partnership’ and as a process of ‘joint ownership’ ‘based on the awareness of 
shared values and common interests’ (European Commission, 2004: 3) between the EU 
and its partners. Although the established institutional borders are to remain untouched 
without the option of any further enlargement, the approach outlined by the Commission 
is presented as rather inclusive with the stress on making borders fluid and mobile. In 
short, the conditionality mechanism means that some states will integrate further than 
others. The conditionality mechanism, therefore, is designed to enable the Union to 
                                                                                                                                                 
of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)’ (European Commission, 2003: 10). 
8 In Smith’s (2005) view this position is unrealistic, since why would outsiders bother to go through the 
trauma of transition if they are to be denied equal status. As such she argues the emphasis on conditionality 
ultimately means the ENP will fail to transcend what we have termed here the integration-security 
dilemma. 
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extend parts of the acquis communautaire to the non-member states. This process is 
becoming formalised with the partner countries expected to sign Action Plans as a basis 
upon which their performance can then be evaluated through country reports covering 
progress on implementation.9  
 
However, despite notions of ‘differentiation’, ‘interdependence’ and ‘joint ownership’ 
ENP commentators have criticised that the emphasis is rather on standardisation and 
homogeneity and for asserting the EU’s hierarchical position in rather traditional 
imperial fashion. Standardisation is evident in the ENP’s overall aim of consolidating the 
Union’s policies towards its near abroad. Instead of having a variety of policies such as 
the NDI and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and so forth, the initial aim has been to 
supersede these with the single ENP, a move Gromadzki et al. (2005: 14) contend creates 
the ‘misleading perception that a similar (although differentiated) relationship model suits 
all the countries” and glosses over the fact that such a “broad strategy does not respond to 
the specific aims of the neighbours’ (Also see Albioni, 2005: 2).10
 
Meanwhile, hierarchical elements in the ENP stem directly from the emphasis on 
conditionality and which means notions of ‘joint ownership’ ultimately are widely seen to 
add up to little. Thus, it is the EU that is setting the goals of the specific ENP Action 
Plans and that will decide if they have been implemented or not (Gromadzki et al., 2005: 
                                                 
9 For a description and analysis on the ENP, see for example Emerson and Noutcheva (2005). As Smith 
(2005: 764-5) notes, the actual criteria for assessment is far from clear. For example often it is unclear who 
is responsible for undertaking an action or exactly how progress will be judged. 
10 Similarly, the previous proliferation of financial instruments (TACIS, Interreg, MEDA etc.) will be 
ended with their amalgamation into a single financial instrument – the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – which is to be operational from 2007. 
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16). Consequently, the idea that the parties to each Action Plan will have an equal voice 
has seemed naïve to many. As Del Sarto and Schumacher note, the various ‘benchmarks’ 
being established that will become a precondition for an enhanced partnership with the 
EU are being imposed by the EU. ‘The Commission does not leave any doubts that the 
“commitment to shared values” – such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for 
human rights and human dignity – refers to the values of the EU and its Member States’ 
(Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 23-4; Scott, 2005: 440). This is also clear in that the 
goals of the different Action Plans are almost identical (Knio, 2005). Another point that 
further emphasises the current hierarchical nature of the ENP and the EU’s dominance 
over the partners is that no new institutions are being established to coordinate it. That is 
to say the Commission has argued that there is no need for a separate (and neutral) 
Secretariat to be established to coordinate the implementation, operation and evaluation 
of the ENP agreements. Instead the Commission has asserted that it will take on these 
coordinating roles, thereby further undermining the level of ‘ownership’ and ‘equal 
partnership’ possible in the ENP (see Pardo and Zemer, 2005). And as noted above, 
conditionality also entails the EU retains the right to ‘punish’ partners for insufficient 
progress through partial or total suspension of assistance. 
 
Finally, it should also be stressed that the ENP has so far been premised on bilateralism 
rather than multilateral or regional approaches. As such the new neighbours have been 
targeted individually instead of being encouraged to coalesce as a group in negotiating 
with the EU. The justification for such an approach is that it enables the Union and its 
partners to tailor cooperation to the specific needs of individual countries. However, from 
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a more Realpolitik perspective critics note that bilateralism accentuates the power 
asymmetries that exist between the Union and its weaker neighbours and makes the stress 
on ‘bilateralism’ appear little more than a cover for EU unilateralism (Vahl, 2005: 57; 
Tassinari, 2005: 5). As such, bilateralism appears premised on hierarchical structures that 
may undermine the possibilities for de-centralising governance by stressing local and 
regional endeavours. It may be noted, however, that due to considerable criticism the 
Commission appears to be on its way of softening its initial approach by intending, 
among other things, to organise a high-level conference with all ENP-partners invited ‘in 
order to enhance the mutual ownership of the ENP’ (European Commission, 2006: 14). 
 
In short, when looking at broad debate on the ENP it has become common to argue that 
the ENP enhances the imperial characteristics of the EU, with governance and authority 
becoming centred on the core and power and subjectivity being dispersed out to declining 
degrees in a series of concentric circles. However, if the ENP appears to be supporting an 
imperial geopolitical model for the EU, the above analysis has also highlighted how this 
imperialism has been under-girded by different geostrategies. Thus, whilst the overall 
rationale of the policy has been defensive and concerned with consolidating and 
preserving the Union’s gains (limes geostrategy), this has easily morphed into 
geostrategies of the march (creating a buffer zone to the threat beyond) and colonial 
frontier (an expansionist attempt to transform and incorporate the other). As such, if the 
ENP is promoting an imperial vision of Europe, then the picture of just what type of 
empire we are talking about and just how this empire relates to its borderlands and 
outside appears more complicated. For example, whilst the limes and march geostrategies 
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read the outside in largely threatening terms, as something to be kept at bay, a colonial 
frontier geostrategy is more overtly expansionist, aiming at the transformation of the 
outside. This obviously raises further questions concerning the balance between the 
geostrategies in ENP discourses and policies. To what extent, for example, is one 
geostrategy being prioritised over the others, or is it possible to identify a shift in 
emphasis across time?  To properly understand the picture and to begin to answer these 




A Region Specific View of the ENP 
 
Adopting a more regionalised take on the unfolding of the ENP is important because for 
the most part this has been ignored as a result of the general trend towards standardisation 
and homogeneity in the policy. Indeed, analyses assessing the impact of the ENP on 
particular regional contexts have tended to highlight precisely the lack of flexibility in the 
policy and the problems that developing a one-size-fits-all approach will have for the 
region in question. In this respect, Smith has been keen to point out that with its emphasis 
on bilateral agreements between the EU and individual partner countries little space has 
been provided for more regional perspectives. As she puts it, ‘the EU has evidently 
concluded that the way to foster peace and prosperity in the neighbourhoods is to foster 
reform in each neighbour first’ (Smith, 2005: 771). In her reading this is why the EU has 
not inserted a strong regional, much less multilateral, component in the ENP. 
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 However, despite the absence of any clear regionalist mechanisms in the ENP we argue 
that the ENP is unfolding in quite different ways at different points along the EU’s 
border. On the one hand, this is reflective of different emphasis being placed on the 
geopolitical models and geostrategies of what the EU is understood to be about in 
different contexts, which in part reflects the different interests and perspectives of 
member states and the various EU institutions. On the other hand, it also relates to the 
constitutive role of the neighbours in also framing the bounds of conceptual possibility at 
different points along the border. This provides for a rather more complex picture of 




It is interesting to start with the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, since it was with regard to 
this region that the ENP was originally formulated in the first place and which can also 
explain why the ENP has become infused with an emphasis on bilateralism over 
multilateral/regionalised approaches. 
 
Given that the 2004 enlargement overwhelmingly entailed the accession of countries 
from central and eastern Europe, it was not surprising that the EU felt a need to develop a 
new policy (then termed the Wider Europe initiative) to frame the relationship with its 
new eastern neighbours, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and also initially Russia as well 
(European Commission, 2003). The inclusion of Russia, however, became perceived as 
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problematic for all sides. Russia, for example, complained that its inclusion would equate 
it with countries such as Belarus and Moldova and worried that the homogenising 
bilateralism of the ENP, which promotes equality between the partners, contradicted 
Russia’s aspirations of devising a privileged partnership with Brussels.11 Ultimately 
Russia opted out of the ENP in favour of developing a separate bilateral ‘strategic 
partnership’ that has become based on the development of the four ‘common spaces’ and 
that has therefore helped maintain the appearance of Russia as primus inter pares in the 
EU’s relations with its neighbours (Gromadzki et al., 2005: 44; European Commission, 
2004: 4). From Russia’s perspective the strategic partnership signals Russia’s 
distinctiveness and greater importance in comparison to the ENP countries, whilst it is 
also taken to imply a more genuinely equal relationship with the EU since the ‘road 
maps’ promoting the common spaces are to be based on principles of reciprocity, rather 
than EU-dictated conditionality (Zaslavskaya, 2005). 
 
However, there were also doubts within the EU and the other partners about the inclusion 
of Russia, especially if a multilateral approach was adopted in the ENP. The issue for the 
EU was that pursuing a multilateral strategy would have compelled it to define the 
position of Russia in regard to the other partner countries in the ENP, with the fear being 
that ultimately Russia might try to dominate the eventual relationship, or at least inhibit 
the options available for the other countries of the region to get closer to the EU. In other 
words, in promoting a multilateral approach the EU may have ended up legitimising 
Russian dominance of the regional setting on the eastern borders (Smith, 2005: 772).  
 
                                                 
11 For an extensive analyses of Russian attitudes towards the ENP see, Averre (2005). 
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From its beginning, therefore, the ENP was infused with defensive elements as regards 
how to mediate between the EU’s relationship with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and its 
relationship with Russia. Soft security issues, however, were also high up the agenda and 
have remained so and have been no more evident than in trying to make the eastern 
partners implement EU border policies on their eastern borders. And last but not least 
there was also the concern to create a policy that would ward off the perceived ‘danger’ 
of the expectation of any future enlargement of the EU to the East and to draw a clear 
distinction between Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and the nearby candidate countries of 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
In its initial phases, then, the Wider Europe initiative resonated particularly with a 
defensively oriented limes geostrategy as regards the new eastern neighbours. The goal 
was to consolidate the gains of enlargement, to provide the EU with time and space to 
absorb its new members, whilst also trying to develop a policy that would enable the EU 
to try and influence internal developments in the new neighbours by offering closer 
economic relations in return for reform. Elements of a march geostrategy, however, were 
also clearly evident, in particular in trying to create a buffer zone to the regions of greater 
instability further to the east in the Caucasus, the assumed source of many soft security 
threats to the EU. At the same time, elements of maintaining a buffer zone with Russia 
were also apparent. 
 
However, this frame of dealing with the eastern neighbours primarily through the lenses 
of security and of trying to keep the outside outside and at bay has been problematic from 
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the beginning, not least because of the aspirations of the eastern neighbours to become 
future EU members. The gradual democratic and economic transformation of these 
countries, most notably symbolised in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, and their claims to 
be a part of European history and the European heritage of nations has meant that the 
question of further enlargement simply will not go away. Appealing to EU norms and 
values and a common European history has played strongly on EU identity narratives that 
make permanent exclusion of the eastern neighbours deeply problematic. A key point 
here is that when the leaders of the Orange Revolution professed Ukraine’s desire to ‘join 
Europe’ this claim to Europeanness was not challenged in the EU, but rhetorically 
supported. Thus, whilst the eastern neighbours remain conceived as others of the EU, 
they are not depicted as threatening radicalised others, but rather as ‘inferior’ and 
somewhat ‘backward’ others, but ultimately with the potential to become like us 
(Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2006). In this context a colonial frontier geostrategy that paves the way 
to more explicit engagement beyond the EU’s external border, that believes in the 
transformative potential of the neighbours, and that ultimately entails an idea of further 
expansion has come to make much more sense in the eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, 
the outsiders’ refusal to let the membership issue lie and their willingness to comply with 
EU conditionality mechanisms (so long as membership seems a realistic prospect) has 
also been important in drawing the EU increasingly towards a much more engaged 
colonial frontier geostrategy that perceives the EU as an Empire still in expansionary 
mode. And finally, it should also be noted that these aspirations have also received broad 
support from the EU’s new eastern members who have actively promoted the need of the 
EU to remain open towards the new eastern neighbours (as for example evidenced in 
 30
Poland’s proposals for an Eastern Dimension to complement the NDI (Cimoszewicz, 
2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001; Browning and Joenniemi, 2003)), and in some 
instances have been keen to assert that enlargement should not be taken off the agenda as 
regards these states – and thereby pushing a different view to that of the EU as a whole. 
Indeed, the Commission, for its part, has in a more recent document opened up the 
prospects for the ENP partner countries ‘to participate in certain Community agencies 
and programmes’, albeit it is added that ‘the ENP remains distinct from the process of EU 




In contrast, along the southern border in the Mediterranean region things have looked 
rather different. Instead of a softening of the border the opposite might rather be 
happening, with a limes geostrategy being reinforced and to some extent even 
contributing to a rather Westphalian conception of a fortress Europe, where the outside is 
to be kept out behind an impermeable defensive border and where the outside is also 
perceived as largely unreformable. 
 
Three key elements appear to be central in this respect. First, despite the fact that the ENP 
talks of enhancing democracy, integration, welfare and security in all the partner 
countries it is important to remember that the ENP was a policy initially formulated to 
respond to perceived problems arising in the East following the enlargement. The 
expansion of the policy to cover EU neighbourhood relations in general was the result of 
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pressure from southern EU member states concerned that the EU’s focus would unduly 
shift to the East. In this respect the key conceptual activism behind the ENP has remained 
focused on the East, with the result that its subsequent application also to the southern 
neighbourhood has entailed certain problems. As Pace (forthcoming) notes, one of the 
major problems with the ENP is that unlike the previous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP – Barcelona Process), which was based on the principle of ‘regionality’, the ENP 
rather emphasises ‘differentiated bilateralism’. This change in emphasis not only 
undermines the development of regional cooperation (and therefore might adversely 
affect the EU’s contribution to things like the Middle East Peace Process), but also 
reasserts a much more hegemonic and imperial role for the EU in the region. 
 
Second, especially since the advent of the war on terrorism there has been a growing 
tendency on the part of the EU to prioritise questions of security, especially issues of 
migration, trafficking and terrorism in the region as a threat to the EU. The conflation of 
these threats has been notable, whilst the fact that the perpetrators of the Madrid rail 
bombings in 2004 were North African immigrants has not been lost on the EU. The 
growing emphasis on a securitised discourse has had notable effects for how the border is 
conceptualised, with the emphasis increasingly being on creating a border of control and 
exclusion. This, in turn, has been to the detriment of developmental and human rights 
aspects in EU policies towards the region. As Malmvig (2006) argues, EU policy towards 
the Mediterranean has been driven by two broad yet contradictory security discourses. 
The liberal reform discourse has emphasised democracy and human rights promotion 
perceiving that threats of terrorism, radicalisation, migration and organised crime derive 
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from deeper political and social problems of the region, and most specifically are 
connected to the absence of democracy, the rule of law, basic freedoms and economic 
growth. Indeed, it is the authoritarian nature of the regimes in power and the cronyism, 
repression and violence that results from this that is seen as the crux of the problem. In 
contrast, the cooperative security discourse precisely sees these authoritarian regimes as 
partners in tackling the common challenges of terrorism, radicalism, WMD, organised 
crime, illegal immigration and so forth. Thus, whilst the first approach calls for concerted 
democratisation and liberalisation of rotten states and societies, the second approach calls 
for cooperation with those societies and regimes in tackling common threats. In 
Malmvig’s judgement the EU has tended to favour security and regime stability over 
promoting democratisation and human rights, a trend that only seems to have 
strengthened since 9/11. The point, in other words, is that despite the progressive rhetoric 
in the EMP and ENP the prospects for transformation in the partner countries of the 
southern neighbourhood are viewed as slim. Indeed, the EU is ultimately prepared to 
tolerate unsavoury regimes in return for cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This 
smacks of a limes geostrategy where a final border is being drawn and ambitions to 
influence developments in the partner countries – perceived according to Malmvig (2006: 
356) as ‘equal Others’ – are limited. 
 
The third issue is one of identity. The key point here is that whereas the Europeanness of 
the eastern neighbourhood is broadly accepted, in the south this is much more contested 
and contributes to a rather static view of the nature of the EU’s borders in the south. The 
issue, however, is not straightforward. For example, Holm identifies two broad identity 
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discourses in the EU’s approach to the southern neighbourhood. On the one hand, she 
notes there is the discourse of the Mediterranean as the cradle of civilisation, as a meeting 
place where cultures are able to fertilise each other. This discourse, she notes, leaves 
open possibilities of a future profitable co-existence and even of future closer integration. 
The other discourse, in contrast, is of the southern neighbours as riven by conflict and as 
cultural others. This discourse easily draws on the role of Islam versus a Christian Europe 
and in its rightist manifestations can entail racist elements in terms of the fear of the Arab 
other (Holm, 2005). In recent years it seems the second discourse has become stronger 
(not least spurred on by the war on terrorism) and can be seen in such things as attempts 
to get a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe included in the preamble to the draft 
Constitution, or in current debates about whether Turkey should be allowed to become an 
EU member with widespread comment arguing that the majority position of Islam in the 
country would pose a threat to Europe. As Valery Giscard d’Estaing declared in 2002: 
 
If Turkey is going to be a member of the EU, it will result in the end of the EU 
because certain discussions cannot be expanded to countries that have another 
culture, another way of living (quoted in Holm, 2005: 8). 
 
Giscard d’Estaing also warned that including Turkey would open the gates also to 
Morocco, whose earlier application in the 1980s was notably rejected on the simple 
grounds that Morocco is not a European country (Neumann, 1998). The result is that the 
current EU approach to the southern neighbourhood is driven by a strategy of 
‘containment in the face of a world that is viewed as profoundly alien’ (Walters, 2004: 
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692). In this context the southern border is viewed as somewhat fixed, though the fact 
that a more positive discourse exists of the Mediterranean as a meeting place and cradle 
of civilisation indicates that room for a shift to other geostrategies in the future also 
exists.  
 
Finally, however, it should also be noted that the southern partners also play a 
constitutive role in how the geopolitics of Europe unfolds in the south. Key here is that 
whilst the eastern neighbours are clearly aspiring for membership, the southern 
neighbours, for the most part, are not and rather have a cautious approach to the EU as a 
whole. Thus, whilst potential benefits of closer relations are noted the regimes of the 
region also remain suspicious of the EU’s rhetoric of democratisation and transformation, 
which is seen as a threat to regime security and as just the latest example of European 
colonialism. Since they are not proclaiming membership of the European club and are not 
aspiring for membership, this also undermines some of the key carrots behind the 
conditionality principle at the core of the ENP and makes the projection of EU influence 
and governance beyond the border difficult. In this sense, a limes geostrategy and vision 
of the EU as a consolidating empire is not only dictated by current preferences within the 





As indicated earlier in the article the situation in the northern neighbourhood has been 
somewhat different to that in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. After the end of 
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the Cold War regional cooperation in the North developed swiftly. Much of this 
cooperation was organic, emerging from below with the creation of ad hoc society-
society links across the former East-West divide. City and cultural networks flourished in 
the region and often largely beyond the control of the states. This was paralleled by top-
down state sponsored initiatives such as the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). As Neumann pointed out at 
the time, considerable idealism was present in the region with academics perceiving the 
North as an experimental space for overcoming previous divides, and as a space where 
constructivist and postmodernist theories envisaging transformation and emancipation 
could be put into practice (Neumann, 1994). In short, the emphasis was on discourses of 
opportunity and promoting a common sense of ‘we-ness’, and to the extent that security 
was on the agenda, it was seen as something held in common (Browning and Joenniemi, 
2004).  
 
Developments in the North were soon conceptualised in terms of discourses of 
neomedievalism, of breaking down the borders between the inside and outside of the EU, 
of creating overlapping spaces of jurisdiction and governance, and rather building the 
North on the basis of interlocking networks. In this respect, region-builders in the North 
frequently operated with a geostrategy of the networked (non)border to hand and of 
seeing developments in the North as presaging the creation of a postmodern 
neomedievalist geopolitics for Europe in general. Ultimately these visions came together 
in the Northern Dimension initiative (NDI) with its emphasis on multilateralism, 
partnership and equality between participants. 
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 However, alongside this neomedieval vision and a geostrategy of the networked 
(non)border others have pointed out that also present have been more traditional imperial 
frames and a geostrategy of the colonial frontier. This has been particularly evident in the 
NDI where a tendency to concentrate on exploiting Russian resources and organising 
Russian space has been evident and also where the idea of the EU as guiding Russia 
towards European civilisation has at times been clear (Browning, 2003). It has also been 
evident in that rather than always embracing the regionality inherent in the NDI, at times 
the EU has tended to see itself as at the apex of the decision-making hierarchy and tried 
to assert its dominant position over the CBBS, BEAC and other regional organisations 
and networks (Catellani, 2001).  
 
In this broad context, however, the introduction of the ENP has been seen as challenging 
for the northern neighbourhood and a challenge for the NDI more particularly. The issue, 
in a sense, has been that whilst the ENP may work in the East its emphasis on 
bilateralism over regionality has been seen as at odds with the logic of regional 
cooperation in the North, where dealing with Russia in multilateral forums has been 
relatively unproblematic. Put more succinctly, whilst the East was a problem in need of a 
solution from the centre, the North does not seem to have needed any new, more centre-
directed policies, not least because Russia has not been perceived as an actor creating 
problems in a multilateral context (as has been the concern in the East). Indeed, the 
emphasis on homogenisation and standardisation in the ENP, its broadly defensive 
conceptualisation of the outside and tendency to draw a distinction between ‘our’ and 
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‘their’ security, as well as its general emphasis on a limes geostrategy seemed to operate 
according to a largely different logic to the more open NDI with its tendency towards 
promoting decentralisation.  
 
Similarly, Tassinari has pointed out that the logic of regional cooperation in the North has 
also differed significantly from that of the ENP in that unlike the latter it has not been 
tied so explicitly to the integration-security issue. In other words, the development of 
regional and cross-border cooperation in the North has not been developed in order to 
ward off further enlargement, since such questions have been treated as largely irrelevant 
(in the case of the Balts and Poland regionalisation has prepared them for membership 
whereas Russia has not been opting for membership). Instead it has been about creating 
spaces for interaction, dialogue and action in realms of common interests. As such, 
Tassinari (2005: 16-17) argues regionalism in the North has been far more inclusive than 
seems possible in the ENP. This is largely because it is not constrained by concerns of 
conditionality, othering and of reasserting hierarchies, but rather with developing 
common agendas among more genuinely equal partners. 
 
Thus, although ENP documents have made positive reference to the lessons that might be 
garnered from the NDI experience (European Commission, 2004: 21), with its initiation 
there was a general feeling that the ENP might have signalled the demise of the NDI, or 
at the very least its subsuming under the more top down ENP. Even Russia’s rejection of 
the ENP and its preference for dealing with the EU through the ‘strategic partnership’ did 
not change this feeling, not least because the general applicability of the ENP to all the 
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EU’s neighbours is reinforced by the fact that all neighbourhood policy funding will now 
be directed through its new financial instrument (ENPI), this implying that ENP 
principles (including that of conditionality) are now likely to apply also in the North. As 
such, whether Russia really has escaped the ENP’s conditionality mechanism remains to 
be seen. Notably the Commission’s europa website states that the development of the 
strategic partnership through the four common spaces must occur ‘in consistency’ with 
the ENP and its financial instrument,12 whilst the EU’s apparent application of ENP 
‘benchmarks’ to the Common Spaces is causing further frustration in Moscow (Averre, 
2005: 180, 182-3). 
 
In short, therefore, whereas the Union’s impact in northern Europe in regard to the 
multilateral setting used to be relatively modest, the ENP appeared to mark a significant 
change. Despite its good record the North appeared likely to become increasingly 
conditioned by the challenges faced in the other neighbourhoods and the EU’s general 
desire for more ‘joint’, ‘coherent’ and ‘consolidated’ policies in the post-enlargement 
situation. Put more specifically, it has seemed that fears of Russia’s dominance in the 
eastern neighbourhood would also have a negative impact on northern cooperative 
constellations. The general direction has therefore been a move away from a neomedieval 
geopolitical model of the EU in the North, built around a geostrategy of the networked 
(non)border, towards a more imperial geopolitical model driven largely by a limes 
geostrategy. 
 
                                                 
12 ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world.enp/faq_en.htm. (Accessed July 
2005).  
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However, this does not appear to be carved in stone. The parties to the NDI have recently 
decided that the initiative ‘requires some reshaping in order to better fit into the new 
operational environment’. A meeting of the foreign ministers, held in November 2005, 
stated this in accepting ‘guidelines for the development of a political declaration and 
policy framework document for the Northern Dimension policy from 2007’. They spoke, 
in fact, about ‘a new NDI’ viewed as a regional expression of the four common spaces 
between the EU and Russia. In general, the emphasis was on open dialogue between 
parties with particular stress on Russia, Russia’s equal position in the process and 
Russia’s input into the talks on the ‘new NDI’.13
 
The participation of the Russian foreign minister in the meeting and the drafting of the 
guidelines was, as such, seen as important since Russia had over a period been rather 
passive vis-à-vis the NDI, feeling that it had lost its momentum (Rettman, 2006). 
Premised on the guidelines, a political declaration on the Northern Dimension as ‘a 
common regional policy’ was endorsed at a summit meeting held in Helsinki in 
November 2006. With the establishment of a steering group to be in charge of the policy, 
the EU Commission’s position was downgraded to one of the four partners, whereas that 
of Russia (together with Iceland and Norway) was upgraded to a more equal one. There 
was, hence, less emphasis on the NDI as part of the EU’s external affairs and increased 
emphasis on its nature as a policy common to the partners in the region. Moreover, the 
                                                 
13 Guidelines for the Development of a Political Declaration and a Policy Framework Document for the 
Northern Dimension Policy from 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/guidelines05.pdf. 
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NDI was now set up as a ‘permanent policy’ rather than grounded on regularly revised 
Action Plans.14
 
One reason for such developments, of course, may be simply that in the context of the 
lack of democratic transition in Russia since the optimistic 1990s, and Russia’s 
reassertion of itself as a great power under President Putin, rather pragmatic and strategic 
reasons have also emerged that encourage an emphasis on equality between partners in 
the North and that in turn may indicate the demise of the more idealism-driven narratives 
that promoted a similar dialogical approach in earlier years. The pragmatic emphasis 
stems from that (unlike the southern and eastern neighbours) Russia is a powerful actor, 
which makes it harder for the EU to assert itself and insist on the reproduction of EU 
norms and values in the Russian space. The strategic incentive for a dialogical approach 
is that Russia has assets (e.g., energy resources, support against terrorism) that the EU 





In conclusion, therefore, by combining geopolitical models with geostrategies it is 
possible to get a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of how the EU is 
approaching its border regions and new neighbourhood. Instead of depicting the EU as 
simply moving along a Westphalian, Imperial or Neomedieval trajectory, introducing 
                                                 
14 Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy, 24/11/06. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/pol_dec_1106.pdf  
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Walters’ conception of geostrategies enables us to see that the EU can be Westphalian, 
Imperial and Neomedieval in different ways at different points along its border. 
Moreover, understanding geostrategies as discursive mental geographies by which the 
EU approaches its neighbourhood also enables us to impute complexity in that various 
geostrategies may be held at the same time, as well as to see dynamism as the dominance 
of one geostrategy may be replaced by another or a different combination of them with 
regard to the same neighbourhood. And as indicated, one reason for this dynamism is the 
simple fact that the member states and EU institutions may each have different interests 
and perspectives concerning the particular border region in question. Furthermore, into 
this mix we have also pointed to the constitutive role that the neighbours themselves can 
play in framing which geostrategies become viewed as attractive on the part of the EU. 
Thus, in regard to the eastern neighbourhood the emergence of a colonial frontier 
geostrategy has been as much a result of the continued European ambitions of the 
neighbours as it has reflected a preference on the part of the EU for further expansion. 
Indeed, the contrary is as much the case, where the ENP in the East was initially framed 
in terms of the more overtly exclusionary geostrategies of the limes and march. 
 
The conceptual framework adopted also enables us to see another rather notable 
difference in how the EU conceptualises its self identity and global mission at different 
points along its border. Interesting is that as regards the eastern and southern 
neighbourhoods the EU has essentially adopted a rather uncompromising vision of itself 
in how the ENP is being articulated. This is a vision where EU norms, values, and 
practices are seen as non-negotiable. The difference between the eastern and southern 
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neighbourhoods is the extent to which the projection and adoption of EU practices and 
values into the neighbourhood is seen as beneficial or otherwise by the outside. To the 
extent that the outside is generally amenable to the import of EU values and practices (as 
in the East) then EU threat perceptions are meliorated and the neighbourhood is easily 
envisaged as firmly embedded in the EU’s new ‘ring of friends’. In contrast, suspicion 
and rejection of EU practices has come to place states at a more distanced position and 
even as potentially threatening to the EU (as in the South). The difference between 
friendship and threat, between security and insecurity, therefore, in a rather subtle way, 
has, in the discourses surrounding the ENP, become a question of the extent to which 
outsiders are willing to become like us. This represents a very different understanding of 
threat to previous EU discourses, where the security concern was understood as avoiding 
a return to the EU’s own past and where the order of the day was denying the previous 
European self. The message now is that the EU has become confident with its self such 
that security has now become conceptualised in terms of the ability of the EU to 
reproduce itself (its model and practices) in its external neighbourhood. 
 
In the North, however, things seem to be different. The prevalence of geostrategies of the 
networked (non)border and the emphasis within the NDI on partnership and equality 
between members and non-members indicates a different logic and conception of self are 
operative. Rather than Russia’s non-compliance and rejection of the ENP (and its 
universalising notion of what constitutes good practice) being conceived as problematic 
and as isolating Russia from the ‘ring of friends’ and even positioning Russia as a threat, 
a different approach is evident. Instead of the totalising liberal security view (that the 
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outside must become like us or be considered potentially unfriendly and threatening) with 
regard to Russia a more traditional negotiated common security approach can be 
identified. The emphasis in the North rather seems to be on generating stability and 
understanding, without this being preconditioned on Russia’s acceptance of key liberal 
values (as in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods). In the North the EU is exhibiting 
greater willingness to compromise. Consequently, the European neighbourhood looks 
different in the North as compared with the South and East. Not only are the processes of 
bordering different, but so too are the representations as to what the EU is about in that 
the identity constituted in the North is a less imperialistic one in that, unlike in the South 
and East where the goal is to remake the other in the image of the self, in the North more 
space is provided for dialogue and compromise with the other.  
 
In this respect, it is also worth noting that with the 2007 enlargement the Union’s borders 
have now extended to the Black Sea and where, interestingly, the approach favoured 
appears to be, in addition to ENP-inscribed bilateral relations, one of regionalisation. 
Thus, in its efforts of strengthening the ENP the Commission has recently stated that it is 
‘currently examining the possibility of establishing closer contacts’ and a regular 
dialogue with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC), and to which a 
separate communication will be devoted in 2007 (European Commission, 2006: 10-11). 
 
Finally, highlighting this is not to take a normative stand on the issue of the practical 
implications of different combinations of geopolitical models and geostrategies. To 
reassert a point made at the beginning, whilst it may be tempting to draw ‘logical’ links 
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between different geopolitical models and geostrategies, the analysis has highlighted that 
multiple combinations are possible. Similarly, it may also be tempting to try and 
formulate which combinations are more likely to produce stability and are more likely to 
be durable and to explain why. The reason we refrain from doing this is that in our view 
this will always depend on the relationship between the EU’s aspirations and preferences 
(and those of salient member states) and the aspirations and preferences of the outsiders. 
The point is that emphasising particular models and geostrategies in one context may 
correlate well with the interests of particular neighbours and prove durable, whilst in 
another context they may appear highly provocative. This paper, therefore, is not a call 
for the generalisation of the dialogical networked (non)border approach of the Northern 
Dimension initiative premised on a geopolitical model of neomedievalism, but rather an 
attempt to highlight and conceptualise the dynamism and fluidity evident at the EU’s 
borders. Indeed, if anything it is precisely this dynamism that should be championed as a 
valuable resource and as such avoiding the tendency to close off options through the 
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